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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF TIIE

STATE OF UTAH

LYMAN GRAZING
ASSOCIATION,
a corporation,

I

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
GEORGE W. SMITH, ELEANOR
N. SMITH, and KEITH SMITH,

Case No.
11849

Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree with the Statement of Facts
as given by appellant with the following exceptions.
page 5 of appellant's brief appellants say
there is no evidence that the owners of the title to the
land which was sold to Larsen agreed to the use by
the defendants of the New Hickey and Madsen ditch-

2

es. The evidence is that not only did Defendants-Re ·
spondents have an agreement to re-locate the ditd
here in question, with Larsen, who was at the tim;
purchasing the property affected by both the old anrl
new easement, under contract but respondents ab
had permission to relocate the same as early as 196!
from Joe Hickey who was the fee title owner in 1961
and who sold the property affected under contract tu
Larsen, (Tr.130). It was to the mutual benefit of
the parties to relocate the ditch and a benefit (r, ;
the property.
,

1

At page 7 appellant states "On May 10, 1966 thP
plaintiff filed a temporary change application No.
66-27 to change iits point of diversion from the Mao· i
sen ditch heading to the New Hickey ditch heading.
(Tr. 43). A hearing was held before the state engi·
neer and this application was approved July 8, 1960
(Tr. 43) ." The fact is that application was appronrl
subject to the installation of diversion facilities in·
eluding:

1. Measuring devices to measure
total quan·
tity to be delivered into the ditch and
amount being passed on down to the Smitn
interests.
2. Proper head works to allow regu.lation of all!
waters being diverted into the ditch.
3. Screw-type gates in each turn-out (you) in·
tend to utilize.
all of which were required to be made, p1:ior .to
diversion of water under the change apphcatwn, '
.
ts wert
appellant. ( R.42) . None of these reqmremen

1

1

3
•

by appellant. ( R.43). Copies were to be made a
part of the record of this case. ( R.44) .
The ditch known as the Parley Madsen ditch
somewhat parallels the New Hickey ditch a part of
its course and these ditches join at a point near the
north line of Section 25 at which confluence the ditch
continuing on in a northerly direction is the Parley
Madsen ditch flowing in to the Carter Ditch as it
nears the Wyoming border.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1

WHEN AN EASEMENT HAS ONCE BEEN
ESTABLISHED, ITS LOCATION MAY BE
CHANGED BY AN EXECUTED ORAL AGREEMENT.
Much time at the trial of the case was taken by
plaintiff-appellant over the objection of defendantsrespondents, in reviewing the adjudicated water
rights of parties and ditches not involved in this action even after counsel for plaintiff-appellant adn:itted defendants-respondents were granted water
nghts from the West Fork of Beaver Creek which
flow into the New Hickey and Madsen ditches, by the
State Engineer, and after having admitted that respondents had an easement through the property iniolved in the old Carter Ditch the waters of which
were also fed from the West Fork of Beaver Creek,
the
source as those flowing into the New Hickey ditch, and also having admitted that respondents
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been granted a change in point of diversion rJi ·•
their waters by the State Engineer.
·,
The only question involved in this case is
May the purchaser of real property under a writter,
contract, which property is encumbered by an east
ment for the conveying of waters, and the owner oi
the easement enter into an oral agreement, with tlit
consent of the owner of the fee title, to a relocatitir,
of the easement, and if the easement is relocated dot
a purchaser of the fee subsequent to the relocatior.
take subject to the easement as relocated.

Now the New Hickey ditch as it runs
through the property involved joins with a ditdi
called Parley Madsen ditch and as the waters flow in:
a northerly direction through the property invo!Yea i
for several miles they cross the Utah-Wyoming border and onto the property of respondents.
Our Utah Court has had this question before 11
in Tripp v Bagley, 74 U. 57, 69 ALR 1417, whichir
volved a dispute between owners of adjoining
as to ownership of a strip of ground and
also claimed a right to course irrigation water wh1cn
was used to irrigate defendant's land across the lano
owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended th31
defendant had no such right in which the court speaK·
ing through Mr. Justice Hansen said at page 7D:
"The law is also well settled that, when/
easement has once been established, its loca
may be changed by an executed oral
between the owner of the servient estate an
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owner of the dominant estate. Citing Thompson
et al. v. Madsen et al, 29 U. 326, 81 P.160. The
consent of the owner of the servient estate to a
change in the location of an easement may be
implied from acquiescence. Citing Rumill v Robbins 77 Me. 193 ; Larned v Larned, 1 Mete.
(Mass) 421; Wynkoop v Burger, 12 Johns
lN.Y.) 222.
Appellant relies on Sec. 25-5-1 UCA 1953 and
argues that because an easement in land is an interest in real estate the interest can be transferred
only by a deed of conveyance in writing, by executed
contract with the owner, or by operation of law.

It appears the Courts have adopted the same

1

d

I
·

'

n

principal of law under facts such as appear in this
case as have been adopted in those cases where a dispute as to boundaries exist and where one may acquire title to the real property involved without a
conveyance from the fee title owner.

In this case there was performance on the part
of defendants-respondents for a valuable consideration in their having given up an existing easement
and having performed valuable services and having
assumed the cost of relocating the easement.

The case of Mannix vs Powell County, 75 Mont.
202, 243 P.568 is cited and relied upon by appellant.
The Mannix case is not in point inasmuch as the
cause was disposed of upon the theory that plaintiff
had failed to show that he or his predecessors in interest had ever acquired a right of way for the ditch
over the particular strip of ground mentioned. The
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there furthe_r said that a vested interest in t1 1 :
lands to a right of way for an irrigating
is not secured until the ditch is completed.
In the instant case it is admitted that there wa)
an existing easement through which defendants-respondents had been conveying their waters to their
lands for many years. It is to be noted that the
cated ditch passes through the same quarter sectio1:
and almost parallels the old ditch. Neither was tl11
New Hickey ditch located on public lands.

In the Thompson et al. v Madsen et al. 81 Pae.
case cited by our Utah Court in Tripp v Bagley ih
said at page 161:
, Ii
"If, then, the predecessors of the defen dants1 rn:
consideration of the closing of said portion o!
the north and south alley, granted to plaintiffa
and to their predecessors a right of way o:er
the east and west alley in lieu thereof, wh1cl1
was accepted by the plaintiffs and their prnl:
ecessors the defendants will not now be allowen
to close' the new or substituted alley withour ·
first restoring the old one; and the fact
such grant was oral matters not, if on.the
of it rights have been acquired
and acted upon. Wright et al. v W1lhs (Ky.) b·,
SW 991; Hamilton v White,_ 5
9;
Barnes 101 Mass. 275; Bemlem v
Ky. 570, 44 S.W. 128; Robinson v Thrai ·.
110 Inc 117 10 NE 647. And where the
of a right ol way,
acquired bY: presm;
tion or otherwise, consents to the closm\ 0t'tu1·
said right of way in consideration of su .8
ing and granting to him a new one, the ng
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the use of such new way at once attaches, and
he is not required to use the new way for a period of time to give him title by prescription."
Jn the instant case it is evident that both the
owner of the fee title to the property through which
both the old ditch ran and the new ditch runs, and
the purchaser under contract, were desirous of having the ditch relocated because of the continued obstruction of the flow of waters caused by beavers
damming the ditch. The overflowing of the banks
flooded the lands through which the ditch passed.

POINT 2
THE CONTRACT FOR RELOCATING
DITCH HAVING BEEN BETWEEN PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND HAVING BEEN FULLY PERFORMED, THE TESTIMONY OF LARSEN AND
KEITH SMITH WAS ADMISSIBLE AND NOT
HEARSAY.
The evidence is to the effect that on May 26th,
1961, Joe C. Hickey and wife entered into a written
agreement to sell the land affected and the water
rights to Lewis H. Larsen, sometimes referred to in
the evidence as Dude Larsen et al, and that Larsen
took possession of the property under said contract
on
1, 1961 and continued in possession thereof
the fall of 1965 when plaintiff-appellant acqmred the property. While the record reflects the
fact that a deed passed from Larsens to Beehive
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s.tate Bank bearing date July 26, 1963, Larsen tes(J.
f1ed to the fact that the deed was given as securi(·,
only and that he remained in possession until the fal!
of 1964. The agreement between Larsen and Smitlb
to relocate the ditch was made in 1962 and the re]o.
cation took place in 1963 when an application
filed by defendants-respondents for a change of point
of diversion. The application was approved by tht
State Engineer on Apr. 3, 1964 all of which was prior
to plaintiff-appellant having acquired any intere;t
whatsoever in the property affected.
agreement to purchase said land bears date of Apr.
30, 1965. Therefore the contract between
respondents and the predecessor in interest of plain· .
tiff-appellant having been fully performed for a val·.
uable consideration at the time appellants acquireo
an interest in the property the testimony of Larsen.
and Keith Smith was properly admitted into e1i·
dence.
POINT 3
THE CONTRACT PURCHASER, LARSEX,
HAD LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO
THE AGREEMENT WITH RESPONDENT
KEITH SMITH TO RELOCATE THE DITCH.
Inasmuch as the evidence shows that not only
did Larsen the contract purchaser, request the relo' ditch but Joe Hickey the fee tit· 1e h0lder
cation of the
had also requested the relocation of the dI'tch· There·,
· t 3r1
fore, the argument of appellant under its porn
not applicable.
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POINT 4
THE DECREE ADJUDICATING WATER
RIGHTS IS IN EVIDENCE. THE RIGHTS ADJUDICATED BY SAME ARE NOT AFFECTED
BY THE DECISION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
Appellant seems to take the position in its argument under its point 4 that respondents are making
claim to water rights not awarded to them or those
affecting one, Joe Hickey. There is no evidence reflecting the fact that Hickey's rights whatever they
:night be are affected by the judgment in the instant
case. It is evident that application for change of point
of diversion of those waters adjudicated to respondents was filed with the State Engineer, that notice
to all affected parties or those who might be affected
by the change was given by the State Engineer and
that no one filed a protest and as a result the application for change was granted.
POINT 5
APPLICATION FOR CHANGE OF POINT
OF DIVERSION HAVING BEEN GRANTED
AFTER NOTICE AND WITHOUT ANY PROTUESST, RESPONDENTS HAD THE RIGHT TO
,ITE THE NEW HICKEY A N D MADSEN
D CHES.

. Even if the argument of appellant under its
point 5 be true, in which we see no point, inasmuch
as no action for a violation of Sec. 73-3-3 UCA 1953

10

has been taken by anyone, the fact that appellant ·
application for change of point:;
d1vers1on
was
approved
April 3, 1964 ' which· ;
.
.
time pr10r to appellant having acquired an intei'h
in the property, this of itself defeats appellant asu
this point of argument.
Under Secs. 73-1-6 and 73-1-7 UCA 1953 it
provided that one has the right to use someone else
ditch to convey his water if he compensates the owne
or if the owner agrees to allow the use. Therefore1'··
written deed or easement is not required. Responu
ents both compensated the then owner and
the owner's permission to relocate the ditch.
1
.,

POINT 6

THE DOCUMENT BY WHICH PLAINTIFF
APPELLANT ACQUIRED TITLE TO TH[
PROPERTY AFFECTED RECITES THAT IT I:
SUBJECT TO EASEMENTS OR RIGHTS Of
WAY FOR DITCHES. APPELLANT IS THERE
FORE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING !Ti
CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS-RESPOND
ENTS.
Both the deed executed by Joe C. Hickey anu
wife, bearing date April 30th, 1965 and recorrlH·
May 3, 1965, and that from Beehive State BanK,
bearing date April 30th, 1965 and recorded May•),
1965, to plaintiff-appellant contained the
111
"The above described premises are conveY
subject to:
I'
(a) Any and all easements or• rights of JS'!Olui
roads, ditches, canals, pole Imes, transm
c
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lines or li,ke facilities now existing over, under
or across the premises described above or hereinafter constructed under patent reservations
covering any part of said premises."
The evidence is that Sylvester Phillips, president
examined the
property affected before appellant purchased the
same. He testified to the fact that it was when Dude
Larsen was in possession. He went over the whole
property, probably in '64, with a group of people.
Larsen was in possession and his brother was there
in1gating. This was in the summer and fall of '64.
He was asked ( R.80)
of plaintiff-appellant corporation,

Q. I presume, you went and examined what
water rights were attached to the property,
did you not?
A. Well, we have a lawyer do that too and other
advisers.
Q. I mean, on the property itself, you wentyou wanted to know where the ditches were,
did you not?
A. Sure.
Q. You observed the location of the ditches, did
you not?
A.. Well, sure.
(R.83)

Q. I believe you testified to the fact that you
went into possession-the Lyman Grazing-
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went into possession in the fall of '64. An 1
correct in that?
L
A. That's right.

Q. When you first observed the ditches, whitr.
are shown on the exhibit here on the board
was water running through the ditches:
A. Yes.
Q. Now, during the year 1966, you have test:
fied to the fact that Mr. Keith Smith-wai
it-that told you they were taking over tn1
new Hickey ditch?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And what was said, other than that, at th
time; do you recall?
A. Well, that is about all that was said. Hesai
he had done a lot of work on the ditch, an.
we hadn't contributed anything to it, andt'
didn't think we had right in the ditch.
11

Q. And didn't he tell you on what he based ni;
claim to the use of the New Hickey ditch:
A. He says they had changed the point of di:er
sion; were taking their water out in the Nev
Hickey ditch.
Q. Did you question, at that time, his right 1
do that?
A. No.

1

t
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POINT 7
PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT HAVING
WRONGFULLY INTERFERED W I T H THE
RIGHTS 0 F DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
REQUIRING THEM TO ENGAGE THE SERVICES OF AN ATTORNEY AND CAUSING RESPONDENTS TO INCUR EXPENSES TO PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS, RESPONDENTS ARE
ENTITLED TO THE AWARD FOR DAMAGES.
The evidence fully supports the award for damages under the judgment including the award for attorney's fees incurred by respondents in obtaining
arestraining Order.
In 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 166 under title "Damages'', the law is stated as follows:
"It is generally held that where the wrongful
act of the defendant has involved the plaintiff
in litigation with others or placed him in such
with others as makes it necessary to
mcur expense to protect his interest, such costs
and expenses, including attorneys' fees, should
?e treated as the legal consequences of the original wrongful act and may be recovered as damages."

cases are cited under said general
•
prmc1pal of law including the Utah case of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. vs. Hartford, 7
U2d 366, 325 P2d 906, wherein the trial court
awarded attorney's fees in a suit involving a contract
fJ()ntl and in which the defendant contended that attorney 's f ees should not be allowed. The Court said :

14
"The .attack
makes upon the juao.
ment is that plamtiff s expenses for attorne,,'
fees should not have been allowed because
are i:10t generally recoverable unless expresi
provided for by contract or authorized by sti:
ute. That such is the general rule we agree
it appl.ies .to claims for attorney's fees
the act10n itself, and not to situations such astl
instant case."
··
While respondents had prayed for $2500 attu1
ney's fees incurred by them in the prosecution of fr
case, exclusive of that fee incurred in obtainingfr·
Restraining Order, the court disallowed the sank
The other i terns of damage allowed by the court 1ver,
as a result of plaintiff-appellant cutting off andir·
terfering with the waters of respondents and we!'.
properly fixed on the basis of the evidence.
POINT 8
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND ON AL1
ISSUES OF THE CASE AND THE
ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
There was no contention on the part of respom
en ts that appellants were not entitled to the ust'
the Madsen ditch nor was there any issue as to sarn:
The case was an action to quiet title on the part ii:
plain tiff-appellant against defendan ts-respondenr
and praying that the court adjudge
had no right to the use of the New Hickey and Pa'··
Madsen ditches for the conveying of their wate:
through the property of appellants. There was L
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counter-claim filed by respondents seeking exclusive
nse of either the New Hickey or the Madsen ditch
and the court adjudged that it did not find an exclusive use of the Madsen ditch in either party.
CONCLUSION

It having been admitted by appellant that rehad an easement through the property
purchased by appellant for the conveying of respondents' waters to their lands, and the uncontradicted
evidence showing that the owners and predecessors
in interest of appellants requested and agreed to the
relocation of the easement, which was beneficial to
the land through which the easement passed, and the
agreement to relocate having been for a valuable consideration and having been fully performed before
acquired any interest in the property, and
appellant having taken with notice of such easement
and subject to the same, the evidence fully supports
1he judgment and the same should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
MILTON V. BACKMAN, of
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK,
1111 Deseret Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for DefendantRespondents

